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Summary findings
Bertaud and Renaud describe the structure of Russian  distant suburbs. Such a structure tends to maximize the
cities after 70 years of Soviet development. This is the  economic and social inefficiency of the socialist city as
longest socialist experience on record and its results are  well as its environmental ill effects.
of paramount interest to urban economists.  With market-oriented urban reform, real estate prices
In the absence of price signals and of economic  are now emerging. Their negative gradient signals again
incentives to recycle land over time, the administrative-  the massive scale of past land misallocation in the Soviet
command process has led to a startling pattern of land  city.
use. Its central feature is a perverse population density  The experience of socialist cities is also a powerful
gradient, which rises as one moves away from the center  warning about the ill effects of public ownership and the
of the city. (Driving from the center of Moscow, one  allocation of land to achieve the "socialization" of land
passes through  rings of Stalin-era, Khrushchev-era, and  rents.
then Brezhnev-era flats.)
The Soviet city is also characterized by rusting factories
in prime locations and high density residential areas in
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The rejection of private ownership  of capital and of the means of production has been a
central tenet of Marxist ideology. To what extent does the socialist city differ from the market city?
How does its land use differ from the outcomes of our familiar models of residential and business
location based on competitive  land markets developed in the tradition of Alonso, Wingo, Muth, Mills
and now extended beyond the monocentric city?  Also, what happens when public ownership and
public allocation of land is the road chosen to solve the long-standing  concern with the "capture" of
public generated land rents by private owners?  What is the systemic impact of the administrative-
command system as a substitute to the market? The purpose  of this paper is to describe the long-term
effects of administrative-command  systems  which do away with land markets on location and land use
in cities.
The evidence presented comes from Russian cities which are the urban centers with
the longest history of development in the absence of  land markets.  Except for the old historical
centers, almost all of Russian urban growth has taken place during the Soviet era 1917-1991.  The fact
that urban development took place in a  period when land was nationalized and  administratively
allocated, rather than sold on an open market for a price, has had a very profound impact and negative
impact on the internal organization of Russian cities. The combination of Marxist ideology, national
institutions, domestic economic system and level of urbanization has produced somewhat different
results in each socialist economy. However, it is quite relevant to speak of a "socialist  city" wherever
urban development is expected to  proceed without land markets and land use decisions are made
administratively."  The  socialist city  experiments bring out  multiple issues of  property rights,
institutional  organization  and governance,  agency problems,  as well as urban planning regulations.  This
paper focuses only on the striking spatial anomalies  and pervasive urban inefficiencies  caused by the
inability of an administrative-command  system  to evaluate even very approximately  the value of a land
site and its opportunity  cost in alternative  uses and to remedy  the grossest  land use misallocations.
1/  Our  initial  interest  in the  structure  of socialist  cities  started  with field  work  in China  in 1988,  see Renaud
and Bertaud, 1989.  A  seminal influence  were the papers in French and Hamilton, 1979. Qualitative  results
comparable  to those presented here for Moscow  and St. Petersburg  have also been obtained  in the case of other
socialist  cities such  as Warsaw  in Poland  and Beijing,  Shanghai  and Tianjin  in China,  see Bertaud,  1994.II.  LAND ALLOCATION IN CITIES WITHOUT MARKETS
In Soviet Russia, and other  socialist cities as well,  administrative  decisions  based  on
"needs" and norms govern the use and quantity of land consumed.  By contrast, in a market  economy,
land price differentials constitute the most important  factors determining quantity and location of land
consumed.  These  divergent  principles  governing  land allocation  and  land use  could  be expected  to
produce different spatial and efficiency  outcomes.  A quantitative  land use analysis of Moscow and  St.
Petersburg  reveals that there are indeed major differences  between Russian cities and market economy
cities in the distribution  and consumption  of land. 2 Inspection of land use maps or satellite photos of
other Russian cities confirms that these are systemic features of the socialist city. 3
A.  Absence of Incentives to Recycle Land in Soviet and Other Socialist Cities
As  their economy  and  their  population  grow, cities  expand  through  the  progressive
addition of concentric  rings, similar to the process for trees in successive growing  seasons.  New  rings
are added to the periphery as the city grows.  Within each ring, land use reflects the combined effects of
demography,  technology,  and  the economy  at  the  time  when  the  ring  was developed.  While  this
organic  incremental  growth is common  to all cities,  in a market city changing  land prices exert  their
pressure simultaneously  in all areas of the city, not just at the periphery.  Land prices exert a powerful
influence  to  recycle  already  developed  land  in the  inner rings  when  the type  and  intensity  of the
existing use is too different  from the land's optimuLm  economic use.  Thus, changing land values bring a
built-in urban  dynamistn  as continuous variations in land prices trigger land use changes  by putting a
constant pressure on the existing uses of land.
By contrast, under Russia's command economy, the absence  of land prices removed all
incentives to redevelop built-up areas.  Once land was allocated, it was almost never recycled.  Without
price signals, it was administratively  simpler to respond to current land demand pressure by developing
2  The methodology  used is based on the measurement  of population  density in the built-up  area, i.e. the
population  within  two concentric  rings  at I km interval  divided  by the built-up  area within  this interval. This  built-up
area does not include  large parks, physical  obstacles  to land  use such as rivers and lakes, and any undeveloped  area.
These densities  are derived  from digitaized  land  use maps,  satellite  photographs  and detailed  databases  related  to land
uses by type of users.  These  data bases  are routinely  maintained  by local urban planning  offices.  The geocoded  data
was analyzed  with  a graphics-based  GIS  software.
3  In Chinese  cities, however,  the socialist  land use system  has a much shorter  and more recent  history than
Russia.  Also, Russia has completed  its urbanization  but China is just entering its phase of most massive urban
growth.  As a result, the historical  Chinese urban core which was developed  under a market  economy  has kept a
much larger relative  importance  than in Russia. Moreover, in China, the absence  of large urban infrastructure  and
public  transport  investment  plus severe  underinvestment  in housing  between  1949  and 1979  has led to more compact
cities and reinforced  the population  density  at the center.  But now, under the rapid urban investment  of the last
decade, administrative  processes  operating  without  land markets  are again generating  outcomes  similar to those of
Soviet  cities: new residential  floor area ratios follow  the Russian  pattern  and are higher in the periphery  than in the
center. (For more  comparative  data, see Bertaud,  1994).
2at the periphery than to redevelop well-located areas with obsolete  land uses.  While the city expanded
outward,  land  use  in already  developed  areas  remained  unchanged.  One  striking  illustration  of this
phenomenon  is the persistence  and uniformity  of housing types in successive  rings around  Moscow.
Each type  is usually designated  by the period in which  it was built.  Thus,  driving from the center of
Moscow, one passes through rings of Stalin, Khrushchev, and then Brezhnev flats.
This socialist land use process creates sizable enclaves of "fallow" or "dead land" areas
which  combine  low  levels  of  economic  activity  withi negative  environmental  qualities.  The  Soviet
administrative  command economy has generated an urbani  development  process with two characteristic
features of large land use inefficiencies:  (1) Areas with obsolete  land use occupy  large amounts of the
total city area; and, (2) Households  tend  to be concentrated  in the periphery with increasing densities
further from the center and "historically"  low densities in central areas.  This pattern tends to increase
transport  costs  and  pollutioni  by  requiring  higher  energy  expeniditures without  providing  better
amenities  such  as  larger  plot  size  or  a  better  environiment that  would  be the  nonnal  trade-off  for
increasing commuting distance  in a market economy.
B.  Why Rusting  Factories in Prime Urban Locations?
The  failure  to  recycle  land  occupied  by  old  activities  of  little  value  yields  several
spatial outcomes:  centrally  located industrial belts, large total amount of urban  industrial area, low job
density  in the industrial belts, and central  land areas fragmented by dense railway  networks. There are
four major consequenices.
First, of  these  pathologies,  the  most  startling  are  the  old  industrial  belts that  ring
Moscow and  St.  Petersburg.  Developed  during  the  1930's and  1950's. these  belts  are  still  spread
between  4 and  8 kilometers  trom  the city centers.  These  industrial  land use bottlenecks  have  never
been  recycled,  even  thoughi the  land  values  would  have  been  prohibitively  expensive  for  these
enterprises  had  market  land  prices been  used.  The absence  of market signals  resulted  in a  land use
freeze that pushied residential areas further toward the city periphery thanl in market cities. Meanwhile,
obsolete and low density activities have remained as enclaves on accessible and well serviced land. 4
The absence  of land  prices and  the dominance  of  industrial planning  in government
thinking  and  policies  explains  the  second  phenomenon.  Not  only  are  Moscow  and  St.  Petersburg
characterized  by centrally-located  industrial belts, but also the total industrial land area  within these
cities  is extraordlintarilv lalrge. For example,  in Moscow, 31.5% of the total built-up  area  is used by
industries, compared with 5% in Paris, 6% in Seoul, and 5% for Hong Kong.  In the industrial belt from
7 to 8 kilometers trom  the center  of Moscow, 67% of land is used by industries.  (See FIGURE  l.a).
The extensive  use of  prime, centrally-located  urban  land for  industries  is particularly  inefficienit in
Russia  because  of  socialist  industrial  organization  whicih requires  most  industries  to  hold  large
4  FThe  almost  Dickensiani  character  of centrally  located  Ifactories  in the  Soviet  Union  and  China  also  reflects  a
very  low  rate  of techniological  chan(ge,  especially  compared  to  those  of today's  "emnerging  markets'"  in Asia. See  the
discussion  of high  growth  rates  withi little  or zero  productivity  gains  under  central  planning  in Renaud,  1990.
3inventories  of materials in order to survive in the socialist system. These industries  therefore use large
areas of landfor warehousing  and heavy transport  infrastructure  -- a peculiar constraint on industrial
land use that results in a low ratio ofjobs per unit of land. In a market economy,  such a low job-to-land
ratio would be incompatible  with the central location  of these industries.
Third, the distribution of jobs by distance to the city center shows that both Moscow
and Saint Petersburg, are still monocentric  cities with a high concentration  of jobs in the city center, a
feature common with most market economy cities.  (See FIGURE l.b).  As the transition to markets
progresses,  many industrial  jobs will disappear  and more service  jobs will be created. The majority of
these jobs will be located in the city center further reinforcing the monocentric characters of these
cities. The histograms of the geographical  distribution of jobs for Moscow ( FIGURE .1  .b) and Saint
Petersburg (not shown) confirm that the industrial  zones do not significantly increase the number of
jobs to  justify their  prime location so close to the city center. No data were available to conduct a more
detailed analysis of present land use and floor space.  But the very high spot prices reached by new
office space in Moscow and Saint Petersburg  are indicative of an acute supply constraint for land and
floor space dedicated to  services in the city center, a typical shortage in socialist economies in
transition.
Fourth, obsolete forms of intercity  transport  further solidify  this frozen land use pattern.
The land of the industrial belt of Moscow is serviced by a dense network of railways which have the
effect of further fragmenting the land and making land on the exterior side of  the industrial belt
expensive to service.  Only a small part of the volume of traffic on the rail network within Moscow
Municipal boundary is used for passenger and commuter  traffic; most of it is used for freight.  This
fragmentation further reduces the usability of land adjacent to centrally-located  industrial areas and
increases significantly the cost of the primary infrastructure  network which has to be developed to
service it.  This fragmentation of urbanized land by  railroads  is linked to the  Soviet Union's
extraordinarily high dependence  on rail transport compared to any other country which is nine times
higher than in Western Europe, and to the industrial  bias of Soviet economic and urban planning. This
problem is encountered  in most Soviet cities and other socialist economies.
C.  Dynamics of Housing  and Residential  Development  in the Socialist  City
The prevalence  of unrecycled  large-scale  industrial belts in Moscow and St. Petersburg
is a subset of a larger set of spatial distortions  found in Russian cities. The process of development  of
housing projects under the administrative  command-system  and the activities of real estate developers
in market cities follow different motivations  and yields totally different  outcomes from those predicted
by market models of location and land use.  The key to understanding  these larger distortions also
provides a tool to design policies for reducing inefficiencies. In a market, housing developers  are value
maximizers while in  a  supply-driven command economy bureaucratic housing builders are cost
minimizers with little interest in final users satisfaction  since these are not the direct clients which are
other administrations.
4FIGURE 1
INDUSTRIAL LAND USE AND JOB DENSITY PATTERNS
Figure l.a
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Source:  Institute  of Master  Plan  of Moscow 1992In a market economily,  private developers compete for the same location.  The winning
bid will go to the activity estimated to be mnost  profitable at that site. Land prices exert their pressure on
the whole  supply of land,  includinig the already built land.  This  is the key  to economically  efficient
cities and  lies at the core of our ulban models.  As the city expands,  land prices tend to rise throughout
the city.  Land  prices stay the  highiest in the  most accessible areas  around the  city center  and  along
transport corridors.  This was already Von ThCinen's fundamental  insight. SucIh  pricing triggers density
increases  in  those  areas.  The  rise  in  density  triggered  by  relative  price  changes  is  due  to  the
compounded  effects  of  two  pheniomilenia: (1)  Floor-to-land  area  ratios  (FAR)  increase  in  central
locations because of land recycling through demolition and reconstruction, and (2) The consumption of
land space per job or per resident decreases because the more efficient  land users out-bid  less efficient
land users who theni move to more peripheral locations where land is cheaper.
Over time. the interaction of these eff'ects produces a population density  profile that is
negatively  sloped  from  the high-population  center  to the  sparsely-populated  periphery.  The driving
force behind this density  gradient  is not master planining by city planiners, but the individual  decisions
of real estate developers  who want to maximize the difference between production costs and the market
value of the Final product.  As a city grows larger and  richer, recycling  land  in already  built-up areas
offers the opportullity  to maximilze this difference.  This is an  incremental  and decentralized  process
but it is not slow.  In advanced industrial economies,  about 2% to 5%  of allL  urban jobs within an urban
area relocate every year, depending  on economic growth conditions.  In a market economy like the US,
families relocate about every five years, but 80% of moves are withint the same urbani  area.
By  contrast,  under  the  administrativc-comiliand  economy,  housing  construction
organizations  are  typically  integrated  into  housing  komnhinat.%'  and  they  respond  to  very  different
incentives.  A kombinat's  performanice is measured bv  its ability to reduce input costs  while meeting
quantitative  prodLictioll  targets.  The costs have to bie  miniimized while the value of the final product  is
irrelevant.  Land  may' be  l'ree, but it must be allocated  from  vwhat  is available.  Due to the  lack of
incentive  for land recycling,  the supply of' land is limited to the new areas developed  that year  in the
outer  fringe.  As a  conseqLuenice,  kiombinats have to  meet their production  targets  using  land  that  is
almost exclusively  at the periphery.  'I'he density of the newly  built area (defined as the unit of floor
space divided  by unit of land() will then  reflect the ratio between the developed  land available and the
amount of floor space to be built to meet the productioni  quota.
As the socialist city expands, the land at the periphery becomes less and  less desirable
and more expensive  to develop  because primary infrastructure -- and metro lines in the case of Moscow
and  St. Petersburg  -- have to be expanded.  But in a command  economy,  housing  is entirely  supply-
driven  and,  if  the supply  ol' serviced  land  is  lagging  behind  the  floor  space  production  target,  the
building  density  in the outer  rings will tend to rise.  Over tine,  Soviet housinig kombinats  have been
stacking up more floor space on the more distant land.  The f'ailure to price land is compounded  here by
6artificially  low energy  prices.  The dynamics  of suchi a  system do  not tend  to produce  the resource-
preserving, more ef'ficient negative density gradient of market cities.5
C.  The Socialist City Compared With the Market City:  Moscow  versus Paris
The  comparison  of  densith  profiles  between  Moscow  and  Paris  is  revealing  (see
FIGURF, 2.a).  Both metropolitan  regions  hlave a population  of about 9 million.  They  are strongly
radio-concentric,  and  hiave  similar  peak  densities.  However,  the  way  densities  are  distributed
geographically  is strikingly different.  Paris shows the typical density profile of a market economy city.
with a negativelj  sloped gradient.  In slharp  contrast, Moscow has a positivelv  sloped density gradient.
The net density  of Moscow  at  1  5 kilometers  from the city center  is twice as higih than  in the center.
The density of Moscow  suburbs at  1  5 kilometers from the center is the same as in the center of Paris.
One should note the drop of density at 6 kilometers from the center in Moscow. This drop of density  is
due to the unrecycled industrial land use producing the enclaves of "dead land" in the city fabric.
The dlegree ofpopulation  dispersion can be measured  in a rough maniner by comparing
the  median  distance  to  the  center  per  person.  FIGURE  2.b  shows  the  cumulative  population
distribution  curve of Moscow. St. Petersburg and  Paris.  The cumulative  curves of Moscow and  Paris
intersect each other  at Kilometer  14, corresponding  to a  population of about  6 millioni people.  This
means that within a circle of a  14 kilometers radius. Moscow and Paris serve the same population.  and
as a consequence  hiave the same  average density.  However, because of the difference  in the density
profile between the two cities, the median distance per person to the center is 7 km for Paris and  10 km
for Moscow, a 42% greawler-  dispersion  in the case oJ Moscow.  Is the land use and the density  profiles
of socialist cities like Moscow or St.-Petersburg a mere curiosity' for land use specialists?  Emphatically
not.  It matters a great deal to the Russian  urban economy' where three-fourth  of the population  lives,
for the following reasons:
1.  Average densities  being equal. the population of a city with a positively sloped  density  profile is
more  dispersed  than  one  located  in a  city with  a negatively  sloped  profile.  This  implies  higher
transport  costs,  higher  primary  infrastructure  costs,  highler urban  operating  costs.  and  a  greater
share of labor time  wasted  in travel,  these distortions are paid for  in the form of lower  levels of
economic development.
Note that the artificially  low socialist cash wage (see Renaud, 1991) compounds  residential  land use
distortions.  In market  cities,  behavioral  studies  show  that urban  residents  tend to value  their  time  traveling  to work  as a
significant  proportion  between  one-third  and one have  of the hourly-wage  equivalent  of their salary (see Chapter  8 in
Meyer  and Gomez-lbafnez,  198  1  ).  In socialist  cities,  the distorting  effects  on land use allocation  of the lack of land
prices are further masked by the artificially low value that urban residents are placing on their time.  Price and wage
liberalization are now triggering massive shifts in relative prices that are deeply disruptive, as discussed furthier in Part
IV.
7FIGURE 2
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Paris  Census 19902.  A large amount of floor space has been developed  where there is little demand for it, that is, in the
suburbs with less accessibility. When transport  subsidies  are progressively  removed and full wages
restored, demand  -- and consequently  land prices -- for this type of high density housing  far from
the city center will drop even further. Prices could well drop below replacement  costs and trigger
abandonment.
3.  The fully-serviced, underused  land close to the city center has a high opportunity  cost.
IH.  EMERGING PROPERTY MARKETS AND REAL ESTATE  PRICES
For seventy  years, Soviet Russia has used its great natural resources  to built an urban system of
doubtful efficiency and  sustainability.  More generally, the socialist city has  inordinately high
capital/output  ratios and requires more resources for less urban output that market cities.  Urban land
markets are therefore a very important  part of overall economic  reforms. The allocation of land should
be driven by its current opportunity  cost. However,  the value of a specific land parcel in its highest and
best use can prove difficult to estimate even in a stable fully developed urban land market. The next
best prices are actual market transactions which are the result of private valuation  of investors looking
at the future and risking their own-resources. Since 1990, urban laws and constitutional reforms
promoting individual ownership and decisions have been enacted in Russia (Butler and O'Leary,
1994), as well as other socialist countries, including China (Kerzner 1993). Consistent  with Kornai's
insight (1990), such reforms were initially attempted  for narrow bureaucratic  reasons.
A.  Synthetic  Land Price Gradients  and Normative  Prices
During the late 1980's, under Gorbachev's perestroika, local governments resources
had become severely constrained. Local mechanisms  to finance the production of serviced land had to
be  found to complement the inadequate resource transfers from the central government.  It  was
therefore decided to create a land use tax to finance local infrastructure. In the peculiar logic of an
administrative-command  system, officially land has no value in construction projects.  Yet everyone
agreed that different locations have very different economic values.  The solution chosen was to
estimate normative land prices on which taxes could be based.  For the first time, various research
institutes began building models  to calculate synthetic  land price maps according  to which taxes would
be raised, and from which land price gradients could be derived. These institutes have attempted to
map normative values of land calculated on the basis of weighted coefficients representing amenities
such as transport, infrastructure, environmental quality, etc.  Typically, demand factors were not
included, and price estimates  were based on the arbitrary and highly distorted accounting  prices of the
late 1  980s.  Regardless  of these fundamental  flaws, land value maps were produced from which one
can infer a city's normative,  land price gradient.
The resulting normative land price gradients of Moscow and  St. Petersburg were
negatively  sloped.  Moscow's gradient was somewhat  flatter than St. Petersburg. The normative price
variation  between the center and the periphery in Moscow was only 2.5 to I (from Rb 4,000 at km 0 to
Rb 1,600 at 22 km in the now irrelevant 1990  prices). Both curves are much too flat. In market cities,
9in the  absence  of major  topographical  and  legal constraints, the  ratio between  the  land price  in the
central business district and at the fringe of the built-up periphery is usually on the order of  10 to  1. In
spite of their correct slope, the profile of these normative curves was highly arbitrary  as nobody  knew
either  the highest nor the lowest values.  Such normative  prices could greatly  improve the traditional
urban master plans made in Russia. but they would be of' no value for the choice of a specific location
for a given investmenit.
B.  Housing Privatization and Rapidly Emerging Implicit Land Price Gradients
With  the  beginning  of  housing  reforms.  actual  apartment  sales transactions  between
private parties have been taking place in Moscow since  199  1.  Privatization and opportunities to trade
ullits are now rising dramatically.|!  A preliminary empirical  analysis of 2.000 transactions  carried  in
the first trimester of 1992 and of another group of transactions in the fourthi trimester of the same year
provides  an  important  first  look  at  emerging  real  estate  and  land  prices.  The  study  analyzed  the
residuals from an apartment  sales model that uses only building-specific  variables based on resales  of
privatized  apartments.  It is possible to construct  a  land  price gradient  by  plotting  the residual  as a
functioni of  distance  from the  center  of the  city  as  show  in FIGURE  3.  These  preliminary  results
provide  sonie critical  informationi.  First, the emerging  price gradient  is downward  sloping from  the
ceenter. Clearly. housinig kombinats are not providing the housing that household value  the most.  As
FIGURE  3.a shows,  the land  price  index decreases  from  100% in the center  to 70%  at 25  km.  -- a
negative  price  gradient  -- with the greatest decreases coming  in the first 8 km.  This  model  suggests
that, at present. imputed land prices are only about 1.5 times higher at the center than at 25 km.  This is
still a very weak price dif'ferential to trigger the urban restructuring that Russian cities need.  Various
factors  can explain  this  flat price gradient  inclLiding  the collapsing  economy, ambiguities  about  land
values. and the disequilibrium state of an emerging market.
What  is rathet  striking  and  unanticipated  is that the  land price  gradient  seems  to be
rotating  very rapidly during  the transition  to market. 7 The analysis for the  second  period in Moscow
shows that the slope of the price gradient has steepened from I  00 percent in the center to 58 percent at
only  1  5 kilometers from tile center.  This a real adjustment of 20 percent in less than a year.  It can be
expected  that, withi new legal clarifications  of land ownership rights in December  1992, privatization,
as  well  as  continuiLig  relative  price  changes  regarding  energy  the  gradient  will  continue  to  rotate
For  reference.  it is estimated that about 125,000 housing units were exchanged or  sold in 1992.
Since there are  about 3.1  million apartments in Moscow, this represents a rate of  about 4 percent  of the housing
stock. In a market city. the annial  ratio of housing trades is often of the order of 15 percent of the stock. A  major
social change is taking place with the rapid privatization housing units by their occupants.  Between late  1992 and the
end of  1993, 35.5% of the state stock was privatized in Moscow and 26% in Russia. By the end of 1994, the share of
privately owned Moscow units was expected to reach  55  %, in dramatic contrast to a ratio of less than one percent in
1990. This Muscovite rate of privatization remains much higher than other cities.
Privatization  of housing units has been particularly rapid in Moscow and St.  Petersburg. By the end  of
1994.  The share of privately owned units in Moscow has risen dramatically from less than one percent in 1990 to
more than 55 percent by the end of 1994.
10rapidly.  This expectation  is also  fed  by a  similar  analysis  of land prices  in Krakow,  Poland  which
shows that in that city the land price differential has already reached a market city differential  of  about
10 to  1.  Polish urban  reforms,  in particular the restoration  of private land ownership  rights has been
more thorough that what has been done so far in Russia.  At this early  stage in the development  of the
land market,  location  values are not yet being fully capitalized  into property  values.  A morc  normal
price  differential  will only  emerge  when  investors have  more certainty  about  land tenure.  when  real
estate  information  institutions  become  more  proficient.  and when  economic  and  political conditions
stabilize.
FIGURE 3
EMERGING MARKET LAND PRICE GRADIENTS
in Moscow  and  Krakow,  Poland
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8/  This rapid rotation is confirmed  in  the analysis  of different  Moscow  housing  price data by G.S.
Madalla,  Y. Toda, and N.N.  Nozdrina in "The  Price  of Apartments  Auctioned  in Moscow:  A Heeding  Approach"
(unpublished  draft paper, May 1993).
11IV.  THE TRANSITION  TO MARKETS:  IS THE SOVIET  CITY SUSTAINABLE?
Urban land markets  are expected to raise the efficiency  of the socialist city, but what
happens  during  the  transition,  especially  in Russia?  For  seven  decades,  Soviet  planners  have  made
urban  investment  decisions  under  four  greatly  distorted  prices:  land  had  not  site value,  interest  on
capital  was not recognized,  energy  prices were only a small fraction of world prices,  and cash  wages
bore no  relation to the marginal  productivity of labor.  The emergence  of markets  will lead to  sharp
shifts in relative  prices.  In cities, the process  is likely to be seriously  disruptive.  We can only point
here at some of the management  issues during this transition to markets.9 What will be the outcome  of
the interactions between the negatively sloped land price gradient with the positively sloped population
density  gradient?  What  will happen  to: (I)  the land occupied  by existing enterprises,  and (2) to the
pricing of dwelling units, both rents and sale prices?
A.  Market Prices and Affordability  of Land Currently  Occupied  by Enterprises
Land  reform  administrators  are presented with  a difficult dilemma:  if enterprises  are
asked to pay the market price (as defined above) for the land they occupy -- in the form of rent or land
use tax -- most of them would not be able to afford  it, and some would have to be declared bankrupt.
Alternatively,  if the financially  weaker enterprises are given a reprieve  or a waiver on the cost of land
they occupy, this will perpetuate the status quo.  The urban community will lose the opportunity cost of
the  land.  New  infrastructure  would  have  to  be  developed  elsewhere,  while  the  costly  existing
infrastructure would remain underused.  If the objective is to improve  land use efficiency  as rapidly as
possible,  one approach for responding to the above dilemma is to grant to existing enterprises  explicit
property rights in the land they now occupy. Then the enterprise will have the incentive to use this land
as equity  in planning to relocate to more affordable, appropriate land.
The value of the land resources involved in industrial land recycling  -- even under the
emerging  low and still flat price gradient estimated for 1992 in FIGURE 3-- is very large.  If we assume
that the percentage of industrial land of Moscow could be reduced from the present  32% to  10% -- still
a high ratio by  international  standards -- then  about  100 square kilometers  of already  developed  land
could be recovered.  Current  Russian discussions of the affordability  problem  of non-residential  land
are a false problem which  ignores the necessity of  land use transition.  By definition, the market price
of land is affordable to new users.  The industrial land may not be affordable, however, to existing users
who are asked to pay for it retroactively, but these existing users are precisely those who are using land
in an  inefficient  manner.  The affordability  dilemma  can be solved  by  recognizing  the  land  equity
interest of present land users and then allowing these users to trade freely the land they occupy.
B.  Impact of the Transition to Markets on Housing and Services Areas
9  For details,  see Bertaud and Renaud  (I 994).
12The  basic price of a housing unit depends  on three main  parameters:  (1) location, (2)
floor area, and (3) land area.  Households, when shopping for housing, have to make trade-ofs  between
those three parameters.  For a given shelter price, suppliers are theoretically  able to provide a dwelling
unit in any  location.  This is possible by allocating different combinations  of values to the three  basic
parameters:  location, floor and land.  Thus, the floor-to-land-area ratio of different  housing unit types
may varies widely within the same city.  The net land area required to build one square meter  of floor
space may  vary  from  0.10 square  meter  for  high rise  apartments  to  15 square  meters  for  detached
houses.  Urban regulations  and the many-dimensional  features of housing demand  impose a limit to the
theoretically  infinite number of permutations between location, floor area and land area.
With housing privatization which has been taking place very rapidly in Moscow  and St.
Petersburg,  a housing market is emerging  in Russia. Households  are gaining  ownership  interest in the
units they currently  occupy,  but different  units of the housing  stock at different  locations within each
city have very different  values.  The larger part of the housing stock built in the periphery of Moscow
and St. Petersburg  and the 150 largest cities of Russia (nationally about 55%) consists of prefabricated,
reinforced-concrete,  large-panel,  high-rise  apartments  of  5,  9,  12,  15  and  22  floors.  The  actual
economic  value of such units and not their resource cost will be revealed by household preferences  for
the first time. High rise apartments at the periphery have four problems. (1) Operating and maintenance
costs  -- defined to include the cost of maintenance  and operations of elevators  and lift pumps, cost of
central  heating  caused  by the  bad  insulation of  panel  buildings,  costs  of  frequent  structural  repairs
required by the building  technology  used, and the cost of maintenance of large common  open space.
At present, rents no longer cover much if anything beyond the sharply increased energy costs.  (2) The
space  standards  measured  according  to  room dimensions  and  height  of ceiling  which  did  not vary
between central and suburban locations.  (3) The quality of amenities including distance to shops and a
variety of services may be lower than in central locations. (4 Transport costs formerly expressed only in
time  to work,  are rising rapidly in financial terms  as energy  costs  and other  costs  rise  and transport
subsidies decrease.
The market price which will emerge as land and real estate  markets develop  may turn
out to be much below the replacement cost of such a unit.  Most importantly, the market price of suchl
units expressed  in terms of market rent, might not even cover maintenance costs.  Viewed through the
prism of emerging market prices, much of the housing stock in periphery apartment buildings may have
a discounted  present market value of less than zero -- a sobering  issue for privatization  policy and for
future housing  investment programs.  In the case of Moscow, as can be seen in FIGURE 2.a,  the units
at  risk  would  be  those  located  in  residential  areas  with  densities  above  the  density  line  for  Paris
between  kilometer  9  and  kilometer  22.  Given  the  current  housing  shortage,  transition  policies  of
preferential  treatment  in terms  of transportation  subsidies, higher quality  maintenance  may  ease  the
burdens on residents.  But it will remain a fact that these parts of the housing stock have very low and
mostly negative transitory economic value.  The high accessibility of some parts of the suburban  areas
(around metro stations  for instance) should provide  the opportunity  for the  emergence  of secondary
employment  centers.  Such centers  would contribute to restoring the economic  value  of some of the
residential  areas.  For this to happen,  land use  regulations and  local administrative  practices should
show enough  flexibility  and  speedy responsiveness  to allow  land conversion  wherever  firms of all
13sizes choose to use this location opportunity.  Allowing  this type of land use transformation to proceed
should be a high urban policy priority.
It should be clear from  the quantitative  analysis  presented that the  suburban housing
crisis which is looming in the cities of Russia cannot be attributed to the transition to markets, but to the
legacy  of the  past.  This  crisis  is the  result  of the  administrative-command  which  disregarded  the
practical  needs and preferences  of the final users and lacked means of self-correction.  The economic
value of the housing that was produced did not match  the true economic cost  of the resources  used.
This  cost  was  masked  by  distorted  accounting  prices  which  provided  no  meaningful  guidance  to
decision  makers  who  resorted  to  inadequate  or  perverse  physical  and  administrative  criteria.  The
scissors effect  between  low rents and  low wages on  one hand, and rising operation  and  maintenance
costs  on  the  other  is  not  sustainable.  Restoration  of  an  economic  balance  could  result  from
abandonment  of the least attractive  part of the stock combined with increasing crowding of remaining
units and much higiler rent to income ratios.
CONCLUSIONS
The  absence  of  land  markets  has  profoundly  impaired  the  ability  to  allocate  and
recycle  urban  land  and  has  had  a  very  negative  impact  on  the  intemal  efficiency,  productivity,
environmental  quality, and livability of  the socialist city.  The extent of land use misallocation  and the
degree  ot rigidity encountered  in the Russian economy  which  is by now fully urbanized  is startling.
The  consequence  is that the socialist city tends to have very high capital/output  ratios and consumes
more resources per unit of output.
A second  important  lesson of the failed socialist experiment  is that the  well-meaning
attempt  to  socialize  the  collection  of  the  land  rent  through  public  ownership  and  administrative
allocation  of land has not achieved the intended  results. There  is nothing  presented in this  paper that
would call  into questionl the social  goals of any  community.  Rather, it is the allocation  of land by
administrative  means  in the  name  of  equity  and  efficiency  which  has  demonstrably  failed  on  an
inordinate scale.  A broad variety of social goals can be accommodated under market conditions.  Soviet
cities remind  US that what is  most  valuable  in urban land market institutions is their ability to signal
through  prices how  the currenit  and  future use of land  is valued  by  individuals  and  society--  and  to
reveal  how site valuation  shiftS  tIp or down over  time.
Finally, the evidence  suggests that the social and economic  transition costs of moving
to markets  will be the  highest in economies  such as Russia that are most highly urbanized and where
cities  are  moving  to  market  during  a  period  of  sharp  economic  contraction.  Urban  reforms  are
particularly  urgent and most feasible in the socialist economies  of Asia where  economies  are growing
and  the  greatest  wave  of  ulbaniization still  lies  ahead.  In  order  to  move  to  markets,  the  main
components  of the needed urban  reform are: clear and tradable property  rights; efficient  and  market-
oriented  informiationi  systems:  a  taxation  system consistent  with efficient  land  use; and,  last but not
least. the timely' publicity arid contestability of urban planning decisions (see Bertaud, Renaud,  1994).
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